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1. Introduction 
 
According to the capabilities approach, human flourishing as it relates to justice is an individual's 
possession of the capabilities to achieve functionings that we have reason to value. In contrast, 
by one salient African approach, human flourishing consists of having the propensity to pursue 
communal relations with other individuals, or relations of fellowship, such that relationships, or 
people’s capacities for them, have fundamental value. This is often called an ubuntu ethic, after 
the southern African isiNguni word for humanness. At first blush, there appears to be a tension 
between these two theoretical perspectives. While the former seems to focus on individuals as 
the locus of ethical value, the latter concentrates on the relations between individuals as the 
locus.  
 This tension can be sharpened if we consider their different conceptualisations of 
freedom. For a capabilities theorist like Amartya Sen (1999), an individual's freedom consists in 
her capabilities to achieve valuable functionings, regardless of the conditions of others; this 
suggests that an individual's freedom is essentially a form of independence from others. Yet, as 
we explain below, an ubuntu ethic conceives of freedom, i.e., governance by one’s higher self, at 
least partially in terms of an individual's ability to care for others, suggesting that an individual's 
freedom is inherently a form of interdependence with others. 
 Are these two approaches incompatible, or might the most attractive facets of each in fact 
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admit of unification? In this article we aim to show that the latter is the case. A number of 
capabilities theorists have emphasised that the reasoned identification of what is valuable has 
relational features inasmuch as it requires public deliberation, that the possession of some 
capabilities instrumentally relies on other people, and that a small number of capabilities are 
intrinsically relational and valuable for their own sake. These arguments have been made in a 
piecemeal fashion over time by different theorists; in contrast, we maintain that an ubuntu ethic 
provides a promising unified theoretical grounding for deeming capabilities in general to be 
inherently relational (at least in part). 
 An ubuntu ethic plausibly suggests that relations play a much stronger role in the 
capabilities approach than often assumed. We argue for the novel claim that relationality is part 
of the concept of a capability itself, where such relationality has intrinsic ethical value. Where 
the standard capabilities approach conceives of poverty as an individual's inability to achieve 
goals that we have reason to value, we contend that an ubuntu approach conceptualises poverty 
as essentially (even if not exhaustively) a disruption of relationship in three respects. First, it 
undermines an individual's ability to care for others; second, it as an expression of the lack of 
care on the part of social actors, such as the state; third, if an individual attains a capability by 
actively depriving others or passively benefiting from their deprivation, then she cannot be said 
to have fully attained the relevant capability since it is achieved by having failed to commune 
with others.  
 Capabilities, as we conceive of them, are essentially (in part) abilities to relate to other 
persons in ways that roughly express friendliness with them. By extension, we argue that 
freedom is not independence from others but rather a certain form of interdependence. This 
understanding of the ethical centrality of relations grounds new normative perspectives on 
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capabilities, and offers a more comprehensive grasp of the relevance of relationships to empirical 
enquiry.  
 In aiming to show what the capabilities approach can learn from ubuntu, we take both 
more or less for granted. Although we indicate what we find promising from both traditions, we 
do not take the time to respond to critiques of either, merely alluding to prima facie problems. 
 Instead we hope that this article provides an indication of the rich conversations that are 
possible when African and Anglo-American intellectual traditions engage one another, and whets 
the appetite of thinkers working in western traditions to engage with their colleagues in Africa 
and the global South more generally. 
 We begin by interpreting the capabilities approach largely as a response to particularism, 
since this clarifies its current salient other-regarding features and provides conceptual space to 
develop a new view of capabilities as inherently relational (Section 2). We then articulate what 
we find particularly appealing about the ethic of ubuntu, though do note some objections that 
need to be addressed elsewhere for a full defence (Section 3). Following this, we consider what 
an ubuntu-based capabilities approach might look like, arguing that a relational instance of the 
capabilities approach is both unique and compelling (Section 4). Along the way, we apply our 
theory to deprivations related to poverty in order to illustrate several of the features that make the 
theory a promising new alternative.  
 
2. The role of others in the capabilities approach 
 
2.1. Public deliberation and the role of others 
We take Amartya Sen's influential articulation of the capabilities approach (1999) as the standard 
view for ease of discussion. This view can be understood partly as a response to particularism in 
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moral philosophy, the position that much of the most revealing ethical insight does not come 
from abstract principles. Framing it in this way helps us understand the distinctive role of public 
deliberation in the capabilities approach. The appeal to public deliberation means that other-
regarding considerations are more central to the capabilities approach than might appear at first 
blush, although in Sen these are limited to the reasoned identification of valuable functionings. 
Our aim in this section is to clarify the respects in which the capabilities approach, as Sen and 
other capabilities theorists understand it, already acknowledges relational factors, such that 
ubuntu considerations would extend them theoretically. For alternative accounts that have a 
weaker role for public deliberation or suggest a fixed list of capabilities, our ubuntu critique 
would constitute more of a challenge than an extension.  
 There are several versions of particularism in moral philosophy. For this discussion, the 
salient version belongs to Bernard Williams, who rejects the codification of ethics into an 
overarching theory like deontology or utilitarianism and has inspired Sen and others who are 
cautious of over-extending the role of abstract moral principles in practical reason.1 The grounds 
for this approach are twofold. Firstly, our moral lives are messy: they are characterised by a 
plurality of values and marked by the possibility of ethical dilemmas and irretrievable regret. The 
attempt to provide an overarching theory risks simplifying such messiness away. This arguably 
not only is a hopeless task, but also profoundly disregards the value of having a rich and complex 
moral life (Williams 1976). Secondly, pure theory cannot plausibly be used as a decision 
procedure for how to act. Williams argues that it is unintelligible to assume that something could 
be a genuine reason for us to act if it has no relation to anything we care about (Williams 1981). 
                                                          
1 We draw on Williams' brand of particularism as Sen worked with Williams on an edited volume of essays on 
utilitarianism and co-wrote with Williams a critical introduction that made explicit recourse to Williams' 
particularist commitments (Sen and Williams 1982). 
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One implication of this claim is that a moral theory can have traction on our reasons for acting 
only if we come to care deeply about this moral theory, which is hardly the way that good moral 
agents seem to conduct themselves. This context-dependence sets strong limits on the reach of 
theory in our practical lives.  
 It is helpful to understand the capabilities approach as being informed by both claims. 
First, the approach is resolutely pluralistic and does not seek to simplify the complexity of our 
moral lives (Qizilbash 2007; Sen 1999, 77). In place of a single capability, Sen offers a plurality 
of capabilities that may be weighted in a variety of ways relative to functionings. Moreover, 
capabilities may have instrumental and non-instrumental values: while a capability gets its sense 
and worth primarily from the functioning that it enables, Sen argues that some capabilities can 
also be valued for themselves (Sen 1999, 17). In addition, although a functioning is defined as an 
activity that we have reason to value for its own sake, Sen argues that reasoned reflection on our 
values can take different forms. A certain group can be guided by background social and moral 
norms, but it can also try to imagine whether other people could share its values. “If rationality 
were a church”, he writes, “it would be a rather broad church” (Sen 2009, 195). 
 These reflections suggest that the capabilities approach is not primarily a moral theory; 
instead, it works as an epistemic tool for understanding how we come to conceive of wellbeing 
for purposes of morality or at least public policy, or what Anand and Sen (1994) call an 
informational focus on human development. Specifically, the approach makes a central claim: 
wellbeing is best understood by focusing on an individual's capabilities, where a capability 
represents the real opportunities that an individual has to achieve specific outcomes – beings and 
doings – that we have reason to value. This provides a distinctive conceptualisation of human 
development in terms of freedom, understood as the ability of people to lead the kinds of lives 
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they have reason to value. The process of development therefore consists primarily in expanding 
and enhancing individual capabilities, and this means giving them the freedom to accomplish 
more and better functionings.  
 The epistemic orientation of the capabilities approach comes to the fore in Sen's 
consistent emphasis on the limits of what pure theory can do. This is especially clear in the 
debate initiated by Martha Nussbaum about whether to construct a definitive list of capabilities. 
Nussbaum (2001) famously develops a central list of capabilities, on the grounds that such a list 
is necessary to sharpen the critical edge of the capabilities approach. She argues that Sen's 
perspective on freedom is too vague, because it does not identify those capabilities that limit 
other capabilities, and does not distinguish between significant and trivial capabilities or between 
good and bad capabilities (Nussbaum 2003). In response, Sen concedes that central capabilities 
must be selected, but argues against a single, definitive list that applies to all places and at all 
times. “Pure theory”, Sen contends, “cannot 'freeze' a list of capabilities for all societies for all 
time to come, irrespective of what the citizens come to understand and value. That would not 
only be a denial of the reach of democracy, but also a misunderstanding of what pure theory can 
do” (Sen 2004, 78). 
 We understand Sen's claim as stemming from the particularist view that theory cannot 
provide a predefined, absolute set of procedures for identifying wellbeing; simply put, theory 
cannot do the thinking for us. Instead, it can guide and enrich our reflections on how to value 
wellbeing and deprivation in a particular time and place. Scholars sympathetic to this view have 
constructed methodologies for articulating and criticising lists of capabilities that can be used in 
specific contexts (Robeyns 2003; Alkire 2007). 
 This context-specificity accords a strong role to public deliberation. Anand and Sen 
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(1994) argue that understanding wellbeing requires us to take people's capacity for rational 
deliberation seriously and critically examine their reasons for acting. This is because we 
deliberate from a particular historical perspective, so that considering other perspectives can 
often be expected to improve the deliberations that shape institutional reform. Some reasons for 
acting are based on what Sen calls sympathy, where a person’s feelings are affected by the 
wellbeing of others (Sen 1977, 326). In acting to improve their conditions, a person improves her 
own affective wellbeing. Other reasons for acting are based on commitment, where a person 
comes to have a preference on the basis of a reasoned analysis (Sen 1977, 327). Commitment has 
a cognitive element, which can be drawn out in several different ways, but a key feature is that it 
is based on reasons that others can share, and it is therefore open to public deliberation (Sen 
2005). 
 While critics have argued that Sen's conception of public deliberation is under-specified 
and idealistic (Gasper and Van Staveren 2003), the appeal to public deliberation is nevertheless 
significant, as it introduces an other-regarding dimension to the analysis of individual wellbeing. 
Sen (2009, 192) stresses that actions based on commitment are not necessarily “a corollary of 
any general pursuit of well-being”, either with regards to oneself or others. Yet, since a 
commitment by definition is open to public deliberation, the reasons underlying it are implicitly 
communicable – such reasons are good reasons only if they have potential for others to reflect on 
them and adopt them. More deeply, the process of adopting an ethical perspective is 
fundamentally a process of being sensitive to the needs and responses of others, and the concept 
of a commitment therefore has a crucial, if basic, ethical slant. Thus, although other-regarding 
considerations are not necessarily an index of wellbeing, they are a part of coming to understand 
wellbeing and responding to deprivation. 
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 On our interpretation, the relational character of reasoned commitments is therefore a 
significant, albeit implicit, component of the capabilities approach, for wellbeing is defined in 
terms of the capabilities to realise functionings we have reason to value, or be committed to. 
Considering the capabilities approach as a response to particularism explains its appeal to public 
deliberation and highlights one relational dimension of our reasoning about individual wellbeing 
and deprivation. Our view, however, is that relationality does not just express itself in our 
deliberations about which capabilities are valuable, but is also an important dimension of 
capabilities themselves.  
 
2.2. The relational properties of capabilities – existing critiques 
We now discuss the way in which the capabilities approach has been lately extended to include 
some of the relational properties of capabilities. By relational properties we mean that if a person 
A has a relational property, then she has this property in virtue of her possible or actual 
interaction with at least one other person, B. Accordingly, a relational property cannot be found 
within either A or B alone; conceptualising and evaluating this property makes necessary 
reference to both of them. This differs from a contrasting, intrinsic property, which need not 
make reference to both (deleted for blind review). The critiques we discuss make a case for 
including such shared properties in the analysis of some capabilities. In doing so they extend the 
relational dimension introduced by public deliberation, moving from the reasoned identification 
of what is valuable to the possession of what is valuable. We first discuss a growing body of 
literature emphasising the way in which we may have reason to value relations for their 
instrumental role in achieving many capabilities. We then discuss recent work that points to a 
small subset of capabilities related to social connectedness, which we have reason to value for 
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their own sake, a foreshadowing of our more thorough relational analysis of capabilities. 
 It is important to distinguish from the start these relational critiques from the familiar 
criticism that the capabilities approach is too individualistic in that it pays insufficient ethical 
attention to the social context in which individuals are embedded (Stewart and Deneulin 2002). 
From the preceding discussion, however, it should be clear that other-regarding features are a 
crucial normative component of applying the capabilities approach, since the identification of 
functionings relies on people sharing their reasons with one another. Hence, Qizilbash (2007) 
and Robeyns (2005) fairly conclude that this charge of ethical individualism is irrelevant. In 
contrast, a relational critique seeks to deepen the other-regarding features of the capabilities 
approach by building relational properties into the realization of a capability.  
 One version of the relational critique lies in Foster and Handy's articulation of external 
capabilities. On their account, a person gains an external capability through her relationship with 
at least one other person. Or, more formally, external capabilities “are freedoms to achieve 
functionings that a person values by accessing the capabilities of other people through 
relationships” (Foster and Handy 2008, 369). They give an example of a farmer who learns about 
crop prices from his friend, who has access to the Internet. This expansion of his capabilities, 
they argue, “depends crucially and contingently on his friendship with the first farmer, so the 
new capability is hardly an individual capability” (2008, 363). External capabilities are therefore 
distinguished from individual capabilities by the way in which they are shared between 
individuals in virtue of their interaction with one another. Since the relationship between the 
farmer and his friend enables the farmer's external capability, an analysis of his capability makes 
necessary reference to both the farmer and his friend, and the relationship between the two.  
 Pattanaik (2006) deepens this relational analysis in his exploration of what one can call 
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“expected” capabilities.2 Consider a situation in which a Dalit, someone from a low caste in 
India, is legally allowed to access water from the village well. However, if she accesses her legal 
right, she may face substantial persecution from high-castes in the village. Pattanaik points out 
the extent to which she faces persecution might crucially depend on whether she is the only 
person to challenge tradition, or whether other Dalits join her in getting drinking water from the 
village well. In this case, the woman does not have a real capability to access clean drinking 
water, but she could come to have this capability in the future. Her possession of this capability 
is uncertain, because it depends not only on her actions, but also on the actions of others. 
Consequently, Pattanaik argues that “our freedom often comes not directly in the form of our 
freedom to choose a functioning bundle, but in the form of the freedom to choose alternative 
actions which, together with other people's actions, determine our achievements in terms of 
functioning” (Pattanaik 2006, 195). Pattanaik's argument draws our attention to the way in which 
the realization of many capabilities can have important relational properties under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
 Lack of attention to such relational properties may have important repercussions for 
individual wellbeing. Dercon (2002) provides a sustained and nuanced discussion of the way in 
which the provision of safety-nets, like social grants, can crowd out pre-existing informal 
collective insurance mechanisms. Collective insurance has relational properties, as an individual 
is insured against risk only in virtue of her relationship with other individuals. Dercon notes that 
only some households in a society typically have access to policy interventions and this can 
incentivise them to opt out of informal collective insurance arrangements, leaving the other 
                                                          
2 We use the term 'expected capability' loosely in the way one would use the term 'expected utility'. As with 
expected utility in a strategic context, an expected capability is one outcome of which is uncertain because it 
depends on interactions with other people.  
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households more vulnerable than before. He argues that public policy should therefore either 
target entire communities or facilitate group-based collective insurance against collective risks. 
In either case, however, public policy-makers require an understanding of the workings of 
informal collective insurance in order to safeguard against the strong possibility that policy 
interventions will harm individual households. More fundamentally, this point draws attention to 
the way in which a household's vulnerability to poverty and ability to cope with future shocks is 
not only tied to the possession of assets and self-insurance mechanisms, but may also be tied to 
individuals' relations of dependence upon others. Understanding household's capability to 
manage risk therefore requires an understanding of the role of relational capabilities to access 
collective insurance.  
Moreover, relations with others can reduce an individual's capabilities, and not just 
enable, sustain or insure them. In this regard, Agarwal (2009) distinguishes between absolute and 
relative capabilities. She asks us to consider a situation in which a man marries a woman who is 
better employed than himself. This irks him, and he repeatedly beats her. In doing so, he 
undermines her health and self-confidence, and reduces her earning abilities and social 
opportunities. This woman might have greater absolute capabilities than another woman, who is 
perhaps unemployed or has a very limited income, but the negative relations between her 
husband and herself results in lower capabilities for her, compared to what she could have.  
 Note that the recurrent emphasis on the instrumental role of relationships in enabling, 
reducing, insuring and sustaining capabilities still allows for a conceptual distinction between 
individual wellbeing and relationships (Sen 1983). In Sen’s terms (1999, 119), these analyses 
tend to view relational properties as being accounted for in the process of converting income or 
instrumental goods, such as relationships, into an individual capability. A woman with an 
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insecure husband might struggle to convert good employment into the capability for autonomy, 
or a farmer with a good friend might draw on his friendship to access the Internet. In both cases, 
paying close attention to the conversion of social relations into capabilities will reveal and 
explain the variation of capabilities across individuals.  
  However, recent work on the missing dimensions of poverty has begun to build 
relationality into wellbeing itself by emphasising the way in which the capability to lead a 
socially-connected life is valuable for its own sake and is an important missing dimension of 
wellbeing (Zavaleta et al. 2014; Samuel et al. 2014; Mills et al. 2014). Drawing on Sen, this line 
of thought views relationship as a form of social connectedness that “relates to the importance of 
taking part in the life of the community, and ultimately to the Aristotelian understanding that the 
individual lives an inescapably social life” (Sen 2000, 4). Consequently, “it is not unreasonable 
for human beings – the social creatures that we are – to value participation in political and social 
activities without restraint” (Sen 2000, 38). 
 By articulating relationship as an individual's freedom from restraint to pursue relations 
with others, the ethical value of relational capabilities inheres in the individual herself, and not so 
much in her positive interaction with other individuals. Consequently, capabilities theorists 
define social isolation as “the inadequate quality and quantity of social relations with other 
people at the different levels where human interaction takes place (individual, group, community 
and the larger social environment)” (Zavaleta et al. 2014, 5). This definition of isolation can be 
expressed intuitively as “that experience in which a person feels like they are sitting alone at the 
bottom of the well – they feel as if no one knows they are suffering; no one cares; if they call out 
they cannot be heard; they are invisible and outside all circles of concern” (Samuel et al. 2014, 
3). This focus on an individual's lack of support from others means that social isolation is 
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conceived of as a burden, such that the individual feels shame, humiliation and other negative 
emotions, aside from the way in which this restricts her access to other capabilities (Zavaleta 
2007). 
 Importantly, the focus on the way in which social isolation harms the individual provides 
an initial way of understanding wellbeing and freedom as a form of interdependence with others, 
though such interdependence is limited to a small subset of capabilities. In addition, the 
articulation of freedom remains ambiguous, for in some contexts social connectedness is 
articulated as a form of interdependence with others, and in other contexts, as a form of 
independence from others. For instance, Sen glosses the relational harms of persistent 
unemployment in terms of “cynicism about the fairness of social arrangements, and also a 
perception of dependence on others. These effects are not conducive to responsibility and self-
reliance” (Sen 2000, 22). 
 In contrast, in the rest of this article we advance an unambiguous understanding of 
capabilities in general as, in part, a form of interdependence with others. We extend the relational 
critique by arguing that all intuitively valuable capabilities have relational properties, where such 
relational properties are best understood in terms of relations of care for and identification with 
others. An ubuntu ethic has a richer normative conception of relationship, which extends well 
beyond an individual's ability to be supported by others or a concern about the harm of isolation 
as but one dimension of poverty. Since an ubuntu ethic locates ethical value fundamentally in the 
relationship between individuals, and not just individuals themselves, it follows that individual 
freedom often takes the form of interdependence with others, as the ability to relate to them in 
appropriate ways. 
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3. An overview of ubuntu 
In this section, we spell out one tradition of African thought about ethics, and highlight what we 
find attractive about it relative to much ethical theory in contemporary Anglo-American thought. 
It is only in the following section that we indicate how we believe the capabilities approach 
would benefit from certain insights from this particular African tradition.  
 By speaking of an “African” tradition, we mean nothing essentialist. We are instead 
pointing to one strand of thought and practice salient on the African continent in ways it tends 
not to be elsewhere. A theory or perspective counts as African, for us, insofar as it is informed by 
properties that are recurrent in this part of the world. Such a construal allows for the idea that so-
called African properties can be found elsewhere beyond the continent. It is also consistent with 
the fact that there are different intellectual traditions on the continent, amongst which is an 
ubuntu ethic as interpreted here. Ubuntu should therefore not be taken as representative of all 
ethical thought on the continent, nor should it be understood as an unchanging, ahistorical 
tradition.  
 One of the more common maxims associated with ethical thought in some African 
contexts is “I am because we are” or, alternately, “A person is a person through other persons”. 
One will find such an expression in a wide range of societies, from South Africa (Tutu 1999, 35; 
Dandala 2009, 260; Mandela 2011, 227), to Kenya (Mbiti 1990, 106, 110, 113) to Nigeria 
(Menkiti 1984, 171). In unpacking this maxim in the rest of this section, we are not undertaking 
ethnophilosophy or moral anthropology, that is, we are not merely recounting what are said to be 
common beliefs within a given society. Similarly, the question of how widely and deeply these 
beliefs are held within any given society is an interesting and important one; however, it is not a 
question that we address in this paper. We are instead interested in the intellectual content of this 
common maxim. To this end, we explore theoretical interpretations of it that contemporary 
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philosophers and related thinkers inspired by African mores have advanced. 
In addition, in presenting what we find most theoretically attractive about this strain of 
African ethical thought, we do not advance everything that many other adherents would deem to 
be significant about it. For example, we downplay the role of the ancestral realm, which others 
deem crucial (e.g., Magesa 1997; Ramose 1999), so as to advance a philosophy that also has 
resonance for societies that do not venerate the ancestral realm. For another example, some 
believe that their world-views cannot be conveyed to outsiders, either because of structural 
linguistic differences or because only an insider can appreciate the “know it when I see it” 
dimension of things African (Mokgoro 1998, 16). We agree that there most likely is a measure of 
untranslatability, at least in part because ethical views do not only express themselves in 
propositional form but are also embodied in our attitudes and actions. However, it does not 
follow from this that nothing useful can be conveyed. Indeed, as the discussion of particularism 
in the context of the capabilities approach made clear, a commitment to the richness of lived 
experience and an understanding of the limits of theory is consistent with the acknowledgement 
that theory and the perspectives of others can guide and deepen our reflections on what it means 
to live well.  
Now, the maxim that a person is a person through other persons sounds like a descriptive 
or metaphysical claim, and indeed it is, in part. Some of what this sort of phrase expresses is the 
idea that we cannot survive on our own, that we are vulnerable creatures in need of others to 
exist and to become who we are (e.g., Dandala 2009, 260). The emphasis on the instrumental 
role of relations in the capabilities approach is part of this recognition of our need for other 
people.  
 However, African philosophers typically treat the maxim as having normative or ethical 
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dimensions. When it is said that a person is a person, the implicit suggestion is that one ought to 
become a real person or to develop true personhood (e.g., Ramose 1999, 52-53; deleted for blind 
review). A common interpretation of this is that personhood comes in degrees, where one’s 
foremost aim in life should be to exhibit it as much as one can (Nkulu-N’Sengha 2009). This 
ethical view therefore most closely resembles perfectionism in Anglo-American moral 
philosophy, according to which one should strive to maximise self-realisation or human 
excellence, where such excellence is capable of continuous development; it is “infinitely 
perfectible” (Murdoch 1970, 23). One should strive to manifest ubuntu, which, recall, is the 
isiNguni word for humanness or virtue used by many southern Africans. Those who have failed 
to do so are frequently said “not to be a person” or to be “non-persons” or even to be “animals” 
(Letseka 2000, 186; Dandala 2009, 260–261; Nkulu-N’Sengha 2009, 144) This way of speaking 
does not mean that wicked individuals are literally no longer human, no longer the subject of 
human rights; it means rather that these individuals have failed to exhibit what is valuable about 
human nature to any significant degree (Gyekye 2010). 
 What is it that is valuable about human nature? How does one develop into a genuine 
person? Which behaviours are expressive of ubuntu? According to the maxim, one is to live 
“through other persons”, but, again, that phrasing could be more helpful to those outside the fold. 
According to an extremely influential reading, to develop personhood through other persons 
means to prize communal relationships with them. As Augustine Shutte remarks in one of the 
first books devoted to ubuntu, “Our deepest moral obligation is to become more fully human. 
And this means entering more and more deeply into community with others. So although the 
goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness is excluded” (2001, 30). 
 Before proceeding, it is worth noting that “communal” in the present context differs from 
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communitarianism of the sort often discussed in Anglo-American scholarship. Anglo-American 
communitarianism has tended to deem norms either to be binding on one because one has been 
born into a certain society (Sandel 1984) or to be valid because of the meanings shared in a 
certain culture (Walzer 1983). That is, it has often taken a given group’s identity to be 
normatively basic in some way. And there are admittedly some interpretations of an ubuntu ethic 
according to which groups alone have basic rights, with individual human rights being 
appropriate only for Western societies (Ake 1987). 
 However, the theoretical approach to ubuntu that we find most attractive maintains that 
individuals have a dignity that demands respect in the form of prizing certain relationships 
among individuals, rather than according primacy to the group. Instead of the relativist idea that 
an individual must live up to whichever norms a certain group accepts, the idea is rather the 
relational one that individuals ought to prize each other in virtue of their capacity to commune 
(Khoza 1994; Christians 2004, 244-245). 
 Beyond the promise of making good normative sense of human rights, as indicated 
below, this orientation is more conducive to empirical research than the standard communitarian 
outlook, which suffers from the difficulty of how to define a community as an empirical unit of 
analysis (e.g. Mosse 1997). In contrast, the focus on the relationship between individuals is 
consistent with a weak form of methodological individualism, and therefore promises to be 
easily operationalised for empirical research through well-developed tools such as social network 
analysis.  
 The relevant sort of relationship is one commonly labelled “communal” or one of 
“harmony” or “fellowship”, as mentioned in quotations below. For this strain of African thought 
about ethics, one develops personhood specifically insofar as one prizes relationships in which 
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one exhibits a variety of attitudes and behaviours towards others such as: thinking of oneself as a 
member of a relationship, as a “we” and not so much as an “I”; taking joy and pride in other 
people’s accomplishments; feeling a sense of togetherness; taking care not to isolate oneself 
from others; avoiding the coercion or deception of others (who are innocent); cooperating with 
them; engaging in certain projects because “this is who we are”; engaging in mutual aid; doing 
so for the sake of others; judging others to have dignity; imagining what it is like to be in 
another’s shoes; feeling compassion for others (for a comprehensive list of these conditions and 
of how they might relate to each other as a system, see deleted for blind review). For just one 
example from the literature, consider the Kenyan historian of African philosophy, Dismas 
Masolo, when he highlights the African communal values of “living a life of mutual concern for 
the welfare of others, such as in a cooperative creation and distribution of wealth. … Feeling 
integrated with as well as willing to integrate others into a web of relations free of friction and 
conflict” (Masolo 2010, 240; see also Mokgoro 1998, 17; Mnyaka and Motlhabi 2005). 
Roughly, the more one prizes these kinds of other-regarding tendencies, the more ubuntu 
one exhibits, that is, the more human or excellent one is. Since these dispositions are more or less 
what English speakers mean by “friendliness” or even “love” in a broad sense, perhaps the reader 
can begin to appreciate why one might, with much of the African tradition, find relationality to 
be good for its own sake. As Desmond Tutu has remarked of African moral thought, “Harmony, 
friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us [Africans – ed.] the summum 
bonum – the greatest good. Anything that subverts or undermines this sought-after good is to be 
avoided like the plague” (1999, 34-35). Although friendly or loving relationships can of course 
be expected to bring desirable things in their wake, they are also plausible candidates for final 
goods, i.e., things that are good in themselves, apart from what they cause in the long run.  
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 We acknowledge that there are other African philosophers who have maintained that 
communal relationship (or harmony, friendliness, etc.) is not to be valued for its own sake, but 
rather as a means to the production of some other value such as utility (Gyekye 1997, 2010) or 
vitality (Magesa 1997; Bujo 1998). However, even these theorists clearly maintain that 
communal relationship is, from a characteristically African philosophical standpoint, an essential 
reliable means towards the end of promoting well-being or life, and so would share our view that 
development theory must systematically focus on relationality.  
In sum, this tradition of ethical thought suggests that certain relationships are at the heart 
of morality and justice, such that wrongdoing is essentially a failure to relate. From this 
perspective, living badly roughly consists of unfriendliness, or, more carefully, a failure to prize 
friendliness, or as Peter Kasenene, a scholar of African ethics, remarks, “immorality is the word 
or deed which undermines fellowship” (1998, 21). What exploitation, theft and racism have in 
common, by the present approach, is that they are various ways of undermining communal 
relationship or are instances of its opposite, discord. Or consider human rights violations as 
consisting of extremely unloving actions, that is, behaviour that prompts psychological distance 
between people, involves gross subordination rather than coordination, causes great harm instead 
of producing benefit, and is done consequent to cruel attitudes or those indifferent towards 
others’ well-being. Such an account is prima facie plausible and contrasts sharply with the 
dominant, Kantian view that human rights violations are severe impairments of individual 
autonomy (deleted for blind review). 
Note that this interpretation of an ubuntu ethic cannot be collapsed into a Christian ethic 
of forgiveness or the Golden Rule. Those who have inflicted harm have a responsibility to make 
reparations for the harm they have caused and to seek reconciliation with the injured party; in the 
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absence of such reparations, those who have suffered harm may be justified in compelling the 
agents of their harm to make amends (deleted for blind review).  
 Abstract considerations such as these are naturally to be made more concrete and nuanced 
in a given context, and in the first instance by those would be affected by a certain interpretation 
of them. No prominent African thinker seeks to offer an algorithm by which to apply ethical 
values and principles. Instead, if one’s basic ethical aim is to honour certain relationships 
between people, then it will rarely be enough to treat them strictly in accordance with the logical 
entailments of a rule. Instead, developing, sustaining and more generally prizing relationships 
requires close attention to the details of people’s histories, self-understandings, aspirations and 
apprehensions, and also of how they differ from one another and can potentially be made to 
harmonise, or at least not to conflict so much (deleted for blind review). 
 In addition, it is unlikely that solitary reflection can produce reliable outcomes about how 
to resolve disputes and dilemmas. Instead, as with the capabilities approach, the ubuntu ethic of 
the sort we have articulated tends to favour dialogue and public deliberation in order to 
determine the right way forward. Because relationships are complex, a person cogitating on her 
own is unlikely to be able to figure out how to improve them. Instead, success on that score is 
much more probable when many heads are put to the task, especially those of the people who are 
involved in the issue. In this respect, consultation, discussion and even consensus are often 
viewed as normatively desirable by political philosophers on the continent. Contemporary 
African theorists continue to advocate less gendered and paternalistic forms of agreement-
seeking as a way to overcome political conflict. One such instance might be the aim of reaching 
unanimous agreement among parliamentarians as something likely to reveal what would be good 
for the public as a whole and to both instantiate and foster communal relationship (see, for 
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instance, Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 1996). Another example could be modelled on the development 
of South Africa’s Freedom Charter in 1955, when 50,000 volunteers reportedly canvassed 
“freedom demands” from people all across the country; these demands were then debated and 
consolidated by a delegation of 3,000 people across gender, ethnic and racial categories (Suttner 
2006).  
 This discussion makes clear that the source of normativity or ethical value in an ubuntu 
ethic lies in the relationship between people, rather than just in the individual, for a person's 
humanness or personhood makes necessary reference to her relations of (roughly) care for and 
cooperative engagement with others. Consequently, human freedom, as the ability to be 
governed by one’s highest self, is best understood as a way of living with others in a relationship 
of reciprocal compassion and participation. An ubuntu ethic is unambiguous about freedom: it is 
in large part a form of interdependence with others, a kind of “freedom to” relate in a certain way 
that is distinct from the negative liberty of “freedom from” the interference of others. 
 A fair concern about an ubuntu ethic is whether it can account for the intuitive values of 
individuality, uniqueness and the like. Since a friendly relationship is naturally understood as 
consistent with them, we believe that it can, but that is something to establish elsewhere. In 
addition, we presume that it is not difficult to generalise an ethic that is in the first instance about 
an individual’s virtue to institutional and social contexts. For example, we presume that it makes 
sense to treat a state as a kind of agent with certain attitudes and orientations that can be morally 
better or worse, and, further, that how an individual relates to others in her society can affect her 
degree of virtue. We acknowledge that these are not obvious points, but ask that the reader 
consider what development theory, by which we very broadly mean an account of how societies 
ought to progress, looks like when this approach is adopted. It will turn out different from the 
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development approaches of, say, Sen (1999) and Nussbaum (2011). 
In sum, our normative conception of relationship inspired by African philosophy 
recognizes that our need to take care of others, as much as our need to be cared for, is central to 
living well. By placing individual agency at the heart of wellbeing, it offers a richer conception 
of relationship than the standard capabilities conception of relationship as an individual's ability 
to be supported by others. In the next section, we draw on relational ideas that are commonly 
associated with ubuntu in order to articulate a novel approach to development theory. Although 
the theory would require contextual judgement and public deliberation in order to apply in detail, 
we nonetheless suggest that there are broad conceptual lessons to be learned from this African 
intellectual tradition that would be worth guiding future reflection about how to understand and 
address poverty as capability deprivation.  
 
 
4. An ubuntu-based capabilities approach 
In our view, a promising version of the capabilities approach is one that takes on board key 
features of an ubuntu ethic. We favour the idea that capabilities themselves are essentially well 
understood as consisting of abilities to relate to others in caring and participative ways, where 
such relationships are good for their own sake or have basic ethical value. In this section, we set 
out our ubuntu-based capabilities approach in two ways. First, we apply it systematically to the 
case of access to water, and second, we highlight how its implications differ from what 
influential capabilities theorists have said about relational deprivations. We focus on water since 
the relational value of natural resources is perhaps less apparent than socially-constructed goods 
such as education and healthcare. Water is therefore a good test case: if we can make a sensible 
defence of an ubuntu interpretation of access to water, then it is likely that such an interpretation 
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applies to all capabilities. As such, we treat this as an extended thought experiment that helps us 
test the limits of ubuntu theorising; nevertheless, for those interested, we provide references to 
empirical work on the topic.  
 We start by quoting what an African elder told one of us in an interview about why she 
finds poverty problematic, for we judge it to be a revealing comment on the harm of poverty 
(deleted for blind review). The interview took place at an imbizo organised by the (deleted for 
blind review) in 2007, where several hundred laypeople were gathered together to discuss what 
ubuntu means to them and how to advance it. This person said that she detests being poor 
because she is unable to share with others. She did not say that she detests being poor because it 
means she cannot obtain certain functionings for herself apart from others (or because it causes 
her suffering as per utilitarianism, or because it leaves her with little range of choice à la 
Kantianism). Instead, she views deprivations as being a state in which one is unable to give, viz. 
unable to exhibit solidarity with others or to take care of them. We find much wisdom in this 
remark, and use it as a springboard for a broad conception of the relevant capabilities.  
 What this person's disposition reveals to us is that what appear to be capabilities that 
make no essential reference to others are often well re-conceptualised as being of value at least 
partly insofar as they contribute to or constitute relationships. While material resources (such as 
income) may be valuable because of the way in which they allow an individual to achieve 
functionings that we have reason to value, an ubuntu interpretation would deepen this account of 
value by awakening us to the way in which material resources can enable or reduce relationships 
of care.  
What goes for income, we submit, readily applies to capabilities regarding access to 
healthcare, education and housing. These, too, are plausibly viewed as having value in respect of 
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their ability to promote or constitute communal relationship. Healthcare enables one to take care 
of others; housing allows one to live with others; education facilitates one's contribution to 
others’ well-being, say, by wisely avoiding conflict or being able to hold a job. In all these cases, 
ethical value is also located in the relations of belonging and caring themselves, and not just in 
their effects on individuals.  
 However, poverty is not only well-understood as something that negatively affects 
people's ability to care for others. It is also well understood as often being reflective of a 
situation in which people's humanity is not prized. An eloquent and moving account of this view 
can be found in the intellectual writings of Abahlali baseMjondolo, a shackdwellers' movement 
in South Africa: 
 
In our movement we have often said that we are not free because we are 
forced to live without toilets, electricity, lighting, refuse removal, enough 
water or proper policing and, therefore, with fires, sickness, violence and 
rape. We have often said that we are not free because our children are 
chased out of good schools and because we are being chased out of good 
areas and therefore away from education, work, clinics, sports fields and 
libraries. We have often said that we are not free because the politics of the 
poor is treated like a criminal offence by the Municipalities while real 
criminals are treated like business partners...  
 
But freedom is more than all of this. Freedom is a way of living not a list of 
demands to be met. Delivering houses will do away with the lack of houses 
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but it won’t make us free on its own. Freedom is a way of living where 
everyone is important and where everyone’s experience and intelligence 
counts. (Abahlali baseMjondolo 2009)  
 
On an ubuntu ethic, this ethical centrality of relations of care and participation, of treating others 
with dignity, is at the heart of what it means to live well and in freedom, to express one's 
humanity to the utmost. 
 In our view, all capabilities have relational value, although some of them may also have 
non-relational value. For instance, the ability to access potable water is plausibly valuable not 
only because it promotes communal relationship, as we discuss below, but also because it is 
necessary for biological functioning, a consideration that makes no essential reference to anyone 
but the individual. This view is weaker than the claim that capabilities have only relational value. 
However, we cannot think of any significant capabilities that do not plausibly have some 
substantial relational value, and so our view is much stronger than those who would claim that 
only a small sub-class of capabilities have relational value. We contend that relationality is a 
salient feature of all ethically important capabilities, and is worthy of consideration in all cases 
when thinking about development. 
  
4.1. Lack of capability as an obstacle to relation  
Suppose that a family does not have access to potable water. In this case, each person will feel 
the deprivation keenly in terms of her individual comfort and biological wellbeing. However, 
over and above this, a parent or guardian would plausibly feel a second kind of deprivation, for it 
is a terrible thing for parents to see their children go thirsty, and to know that they will not be 
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able to have the experience of a bath or a shower. It is a further burden for parents to sacrifice the 
income they would have spent on food, clothes, books and toys for their children on having to 
buy water for them. Should they have to queue for hours at a single tap that services several 
hundred people, or walk great distances to fetch water from a spring or a river, the cost to their 
time is a further diversion from their ability to care for their children in other ways, such as 
playing with them, telling them stories, helping them with their homework and guiding them in 
their ethical upbringing.3 
 Conversely, should the family have access to potable water, then it would not only 
benefit each person’s biological functioning. Providing water to one’s child is an expression of 
care for her biological needs, and is part of the process of enabling a child to grow into a caring 
individual herself. From this perspective, part of the ethical significance of providing water to 
another is that this would enable her to care for and more generally commune with others.  
 We use the example of the caring relations between parents and children to bring out the 
issue more sharply. This is not because we think that all relations of care should approximate the 
relation between parent and child. However, we recognise that many of us live in societies in 
which systemic violence and social alienation are deeply normalised, such that we may become 
desensitised to relations of exploitation and harm. In such circumstances, we hope that familial 
                                                          
3 Access to water is typically, although not always, deeply gendered, where women tend to bear the highest 
burdens from divestment in public water provision in terms of traveling to get water, paying for water, caring for 
those suffering from water-borne diseases, and needing water to cook and clean (see, for instance, Zwarteveen 
1997; Crow and Sultana 2002; Sorenson, Morssink, and Campos 2011; Koolwal and Van de Walle 2013). These 
work burdens characteristically reflect in women working longer hours than men, with less time for leisure and 
socialising (Roy and Crow 2004; Blackden and Wodon 2006). While such work subsidises men’s wage labour, it 
is seldom formally considered in economic models (for critiques of this, see for instance, Agénor, Canuto, and da 
Silva 2014; Ferrant, Pesando, and Nowacka 2014; Fontana 2014). Empirical work suggests that, in general, 
divestment in public goods disproportionately impacts women. In this regard, the gendered impacts of structural 
adjustment are well-documented (see, for instance, AAWORD 1985; Imam 1997; Pereira 2002)   . 
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relations of care serve as an immediate and vivid example of how material deprivations can 
impede these relations of care in ways that are ethically salient. We think, however, this should 
illustrate how all relations of care are valuable, regardless of whether they occur in families or 
outside of them. 
 What goes for water, we suggest, goes for other standard capabilities. The fact of one’s 
child, or one’s relative, or one’s neighbour, being sick is bad, but the fact of one being unable to 
help them is worse (even if not necessarily an occasion for blame). Similarly, a person's lack of 
education diminishes the range of choices available to him, but his lack of education may also 
prevent him from helping his children learn at school or make it more difficult for him to find 
gainful employment so as to take care of his loved ones, situations that are not ethically 
desirable. These examples suggest that capability deprivation does not merely detract from the 
quality of life for individuals considered in isolation; it also essentially inhibits the kinds of 
sharing and participative relationships between individuals that are central to an ubuntu ethic. 
This is true for members of a family, members of a community, and social actors such as the 
state. 
 In contrast to our view, capabilities theorists tend to see only a sub-class of capabilities as 
having relational value and locate the ethical value in the individual rather than in relations 
between individuals. For instance, Nussbaum provides a list of capabilities that she takes to be 
central to living well; of these, the capability for affiliation is considered separately from other 
capabilities, such as the capability for bodily health (Nussbaum 2003). Similarly, those working 
on relational capabilities that are missing from standard indicators of poverty consider social 
isolation to be a deprivation that is conceptually distinct from other capabilities (e.g. Zavaleta et 
al. 2014). In both cases, the focus is on how an individual is harmed by her social isolation. 
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However, doing so obscures the underlying analytical relation between an individual's attainment 
of capabilities for herself, and an individual's ability to enter into relationships of identity and 
solidarity with others.  
 An ubuntu view, on the other hand, places relationship at the centre of the human good, 
and therefore provides a more intuitive and unified way of understanding the interaction between 
different capabilities. This is important for systematically investigating the consequences of 
policy interventions and the way in which relationships of care and other forms of communion 
mediate and shape these interventions.  
 
4.2. Lack of capability as being the disruption of relation  
On an ubuntu ethic, all individuals should develop their humanness by communing with others, 
which in turn means helping them where they can and the cost of doing so is not prohibitive 
particularly with respect to the relationships they already have established. It follows that 
organisations and groups, which are composed of individuals, should likewise help others. With 
the ability to aid comes responsibility, and so the duty to help those who are worse off lies not 
merely with the state, but with any social actors in a position to do some good without 
substantially sacrificing communal considerations elsewhere. 
 Thus, in cases where individuals lack a capability, such as the ability to access water, and 
social actors, such as the state, could feasibly provide them with this capability and do not, we 
say that these social actors have failed to take care of those in need. Here, capability deprivation 
is reflective of a situation in which social actors do not work to foster other's wellbeing, and are 
not sufficiently motivated by sympathy or the judgement that others’ wellbeing matters for its 
own sake. 
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 In addition to failing to care for others’ quality of life, we maintain that these actors 
would be failing to share a way of life with others. For instance, they would be treating those in 
need of water as separate and inferior, instead of working to develop a sense of identity with 
them. The deprivation of this capability is therefore in part a deprivation of the proper, 
cooperative relationship that should obtain within society. In this sense, the attainment of an 
individual capability, such as access to water, is also the attainment of another capability, that of 
social actors such as the state to relate to individuals in a cohesive way. 
 In contrast to our view, capabilities theorists do not focus on the disruption of these 
relations as indicative of a lack of social identity and solidarity, or, conversely, on the attainment 
of relations as an expression of them. For instance, Sen argues that the absence of social safety 
nets during the East Asian crisis resulted in fresh inequality and destitution for socially excluded 
individuals, who disproportionately bore the negative impacts of the crisis (Sen 2000, 36). Here, 
the focus is on the consequences for individuals in themselves. An ubuntu interpretation, 
however, would also focus our attention on the way in which the absence of social safety nets is 
an expression of lack of identity and solidarity between the state and the most vulnerable in 
society. Similarly, when Sen points out that widespread land reform in Japan provided basic 
agricultural resources to the most vulnerable in society and thereby substantially reduced social 
exclusion, he focuses on the consequences for individuals considered apart from their relations 
with others (Sen 2000, 34). An ubuntu interpretation, however, would also bring our attention to 
the way in which land reform expressed and facilitated greater togetherness and reciprocity 
between state and citizen.  
 Unlike standard accounts of capabilities, this focus on relationship provides us with the 
language to articulate why the attainment of individual capabilities is simultaneously the 
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strengthening of the relationship between individuals and social actors such as the state. 
Consequently, it provides a simple and direct way of distinguishing between the inability of 
social actors such as the state to enable individual capabilities, and their reluctance to do so. 
While capability deprivation in the former situation is bad, capability deprivation in the latter 
situation is morally much worse, an injustice, and helps explain how this might weaken the 
state's legitimacy in the eyes of citizens.  
 
4.3. Skewed distribution weakening a capability  
The skewed distribution of resources leading to the uneven fulfilment of capabilities within 
society may be reflective of two kinds of failure of relationship: actively dispossessing others of 
resources or passively benefiting from the way in which social actors dispossess others. If one 
person has access to water at the expense of another, by depriving her of access or benefiting 
from her deprivation, then by our ubuntu-based approach we can say she does not truly have this 
capability in its full sense. The capability is itself marred by the unfriendly or discordant way in 
which it is attained and sustained.  
 The active dispossession of others is often carried out by institutional actors such as the 
state or private companies. Examples include forcibly removing communities so as to access 
lucrative land4 and polluting groundwater systems so as to decrease the costs of industrial 
activities. Should an individual improve her capabilities to access water, for instance, by actively 
participating in theft, then an ubuntu-based view of capabilities would deny her the full 
attainment of them, since it has been achieved through an act of unfriendliness towards others. 
Conversely, in understanding the true nature of capabilities deprivation through dispossession, 
                                                          
4 For a first-hand account of forced removals, see Abahlali baseMjondolo (2009).  
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one is compelled to pay close attention to the causal relations that brought about the deprivation.  
 The class of individuals who actively dispossess others, however, is likely to be smaller 
than those who passively benefit from such dispossession. For instance, today many large white-
owned agricultural enterprises in South Africa benefit from a plentiful supply of water as a 
consequence of the way in which infrastructural sources and water were diverted away from 
former African “homelands” by the apartheid state.5 Although these individuals may have the 
capability to access a plentiful and cheap supply of water, in passively benefiting from the 
dispossession of others, their capability is marred, or imperfectly realised, for it cannot be said 
that they are living well, where living well means prizing communion. We can extend the 
example further. For many African households that do not have access to piped water as a 
consequence of deliberate exclusion from water under apartheid, women often disproportionately 
bear the burden of fetching water from streams, springs and communal taps (Tsheola 2012). In 
such cases, while all family members have access to water as a consequence of this, the 
disproportionate burden on women implies that the capability is significantly marred. 
 The focus on relationship provides us with the language to distinguish different forms of 
inequality from one another. Suppose there is an island where one half has more capabilities in 
virtue of a random distribution of resources that favours their side, and that they are utterly cut 
off from the other side of the island. This differs from the situation we have just described, in 
which some people dispossess others and thereby improve their capabilities. While inequality in 
the first situation is bad, inequality in the second situation is worse, in the sense of being unjust, 
since it is reflective of a failure of human relationship.  
 This means that, in situations characterised by inequality arising out of unfriendly 
                                                          
5 Governance of water in South Africa is complex and shaped by economic geographies that are contoured by race, 
class, gender and citizenship (Chikhozo 2006; Movik 2014; Clifford-Holmes et al. 2016; Munro et al. 2016) 
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relationships, it is insufficient to focus solely on those who are deprived of capabilities. One 
must also attend to those who have attained capabilities. An ubuntu focus then allows us to 
distinguish between those who have attained capabilities through friendly relationships, and 
those who have attained capabilities at the expense of others.  
In practice, this implies that data for the empirical measurement of capabilities should 
ideally be gathered together with information on standard categories of dispossession such as 
race, class, gender, caste, religion, ethnicity and citizenship where historically relevant. 
Capability deprivation and attainment can then by disaggregated by these categories of 
dispossession. If members of a privileged social category consistently attain capabilities while 
members of disadvantaged social categories consistently exhibit deprivations, one could 
plausibly take this as a warning sign that unfriendly or discordant relations are widespread and 
persistent, and attenuate the measurement of capability attainment for privileged individuals 
accordingly, for they cannot be said to be living well qua honouring communion.  
 This approach differs from existing ones to capability deprivation in a number of 
interesting ways. First, the capabilities approach tends to focus on multidimensional poverty as 
capabilities deprivation in terms that are conceptually distinct from capabilities attainment. 
Second, the capabilities approach does not distinguish between capabilities that are attained 
through friendly relations and those that are attained through unfriendly relations. As a 
consequence of this, considerations of inequality are applied after the measurement of wellbeing. 
For instance, in their proposal for the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index, the 
capabilities theorists Sabina Alkire and James Foster (2010) present a way of adjusting or 
attenuating each dimension's average value according to its level of inequality. Here, inequality 
is measured across the dimensions of health, education or income, rather than across social 
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categories of dispossession. While an aggregate picture of inequality across society is 
undoubtedly useful, the picture does not distinguish between inequality arising out of discordant 
or anti-social relationships, and inequality arising out of other circumstances, such as the 
concentration of economic hubs, natural resources or infrastructure in different parts of a 
country. Accordingly, it is difficult to identify the way in which various categories of 
dispossession may result in different forms of inequality. For instance, general wealth inequality 
in the United States has increased since the severe recession in 2007, and by 2014 the median 
wealth of upper-income families was seven times the median wealth of middle-income families 
(Fry and Kochhar 2014). In contrast, wealth inequality between races is significantly higher: in 
2014 the median wealth of white households was thirteen times the median wealth of black 
households (Kochhar and Fry 2014). However, since African Americans are a minority, an 
inequality-adjusted HDI would not be sufficiently sensitive to this substantial failure of 
relationship.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have attempted to find a point of agreement between the capabilities approach 
and an ubuntu ethic. To do so, we tried to show that an ubuntu reading of the capabilities 
approach not only provides a theoretical grounding for existing work on relational capabilities, 
but also shows how deeply relational all intuitively important capabilities are. This expands the 
focus of the capabilities approach to consider the relations between individuals as the locus of 
ethical value. In doing so, we argued, an ubuntu approach reveals new ways of understanding the 
ethical significance of standard capabilities, and provides an intuitive and unified theoretical 
framework for interpreting and investigating the relational properties of capabilities. 
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On our account, this ubuntu approach conceptualises capabilities as having intrinsically 
relational properties in three respects. First, capabilities deprivation can constrain an individual's 
ability to care for others. While this person may have deep and caring relations with others, these 
relations could be more perfectly realized, we argued, if she was not forced into survivalist mode 
by her material deprivation. Second, capabilities deprivation may be an outcome of lack of care 
on the part of social actors, such as the state. There is, we argued, a significant ethical difference 
between a state that is unable to enable individuals’ capabilities, and a state that is reluctant to do 
so. Third, an individual who attains a capability through the deprivation of others does not have 
this capability in full, since it is marred by the ill-treatment of others. Again, there is a significant 
ethical difference between the person who attains capabilities by benefiting from the ill-treatment 
of others and the person who does not. The badness of these situations, we contended, cannot be 
explained simply by pointing to material deprivation; instead, it also requires an understanding of 
the ethical centrality of relations of care, friendship and solidarity.  
This account therefore modifies the informational focus of the capabilities approach in 
the following way. Wellbeing is best understood by focusing on individuals’ capabilities, where 
a capability reflects opportunities to achieve functionings we have reason to value; these 
capabilities have intrinsic relational properties – they are opportunities to enter into relations of 
care with others, and they are an outcome of relations of care with others.  
 Capabilities theorists often formulate development as the process of expanding an 
individual’s freedom to accomplish more and better functionings. However, we argued, their 
interpretation of development as freedom is ambiguous: sometimes it consists in independence 
from others, and at other times it consists in interdependence with others. An ubuntu 
interpretation of development as freedom is more consistent: if development is a process of 
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expanding an individual’s freedoms to accomplish functionings, this freedom is a form of 
interdependence with others, where this enables her to express and receive care and thereby 
exercise her dignity. 
This view has two implications for empirical research on poverty. First, investigating 
capabilities deprivation requires one to pay attention to the ways in which such deprivations 
shape relations of care and solidarity, and the extent to which these deprivations are an outcome 
of exploitative or callous relations with social actors, such as the state. Second, a meaningful 
investigation into capabilities deprivation requires a concomitant analysis of those who have 
attained capabilities, and the ways in which they have done so. This calls for us to attend to the 
relations between those who are deprived of capabilities, and those who have attained them – 
between those who are poor and those who are rich. We argue that such a relational analysis is 
an intrinsic part of conceptualising and measuring wellbeing, and should therefore not be applied 
separately from, or as an afterthought to, the measurement of human development. This approach 
is already implicitly evident in some of the empirical literature we discussed on risk and 
vulnerability. However, we believe empirical work would benefit from the more systematic and 
explicit theoretical framework advanced in this paper. In subsequent work we aim to explore this 
in greater detail. 
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